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Abstract—Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are regularly used
in asset monitoring applications, where the location of an asset
or assets must be kept private. Providing location privacy for
such an asset is tantamount to protecting the location of a source
node from an attacker who is attempting to locate it. Although no
solution exists to provide source location privacy over an extended
period, it has been shown that attackers can be sufficiently
inhibited by prominent approaches that use either a phantom
node, via which protocol messages are routed, or nodes assigned
to be fake sources, each of which then broadcast fake messages.
However, the applicability of fake source approaches to networks
where location privacy must be maintained for multiple sources
has yet to be considered. This paper addresses this issue by
analysing a representative fake source algorithm in the context of
multiple sources, presenting simulation results that demonstrate
the shortcomings of the approach and identifying the underlying
limitations to pave the way for the development of algorithms
capable of accounting for multiple sources.
Keywords-Context Privacy; Fake Source; Location; Multiple
Sources; Wireless Sensor Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are frequently cited as
an enabling technology for the Internet of Things (IoT), as
well as being fundamental to solving problems in application
domains such as animal conservation, healthcare and military
intelligence [1], [2], [3]. The need to monitor assets, such as
endangered animals or military personnel, is common across
such application domains. As monitored assets are invariably
valuable, consideration must be given to the way in which
sensed information is communicated during monitoring. In
many situations it is desirable for the location of the asset
being monitored to be kept private.
The source location privacy (SLP) problem focuses on
ensuring that the location of a source node or asset can only be
observed or inferred by those intended to observe or decipher
it [4]. WSNs operate in a broadcast medium, which means
attackers can intercept messages and use the knowledge gained
to locate assets. Three broad categories of techniques exist
for solving the SLP problem in the context of a distributed
local eavesdropper: (i) fake source techniques that allocate
nodes to act like sources but send fake messages that are
indistinguishable from real messages [5], (ii) routing-based
techniques [4], and (iii) hybrid techniques that combine both
routing and fake sources [6], [7]. In this paper we focus on the
fake source approach, though much of the analysis presented
is similarly relevant to routing-based and hybrid approaches.
Much research in the application of fake sources has focused
on the development of algorithms that preserve SLP whilst
minimising network energy consumption [7], [8]. Work has
also focused on examining heuristics for the selection of
fake sources, a problem that is known to be NP-complete,
in order to develop adaptive algorithms that are suitable for
practical deployment [5], [9]. Despite this body of work, little
has been done to assess the applicability of the fake source
approach in networks with multiple sources, a characteristic
of an increasing number of WSN application scenarios and a
requirement in the context of the IoT.
The need to preserve the location privacy of multiple assets
is a practical issue that must be overcome before the use
of WSNs can become widespread in monitoring applications,
not least because single asset scenarios can rarely justify the
considerable expense of deploying a large-scale WSN. The
work presented in this paper moves to address this challenge,
since it provides the results and analysis that demonstrate the
immediate applicability of current fake source algorithms to
inform the adaptation or development of algorithms to account
for multiple information sources.
A. Contributions
In this paper we contribute to the understanding of existing
fake source algorithms for source location privacy in networks
containing multiple information sources. In doing this we:
• Provide privacy and energy focused simulation results
for fake source algorithms operating in networks with
multiple information sources.
• Demonstrate that, in the worst case, communicating with
no context-privacy preserving algorithm can yield better
privacy than a fake source algorithm in networks with
multiple sources for the scales presented.
• Identify shortcomings in the considerations of fake source
algorithms that lead to the location privacy of any single
source being compromised.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section II we
provide a survey of related research. The network and attacker
models are detailed in Section III. Section IV provides details
of the simulation experiments and the fake source algorithm
to be analysed. The results generated by these experiments
are analysed and discussed in Section V, before Section VI
concludes the paper with a summary of outcomes.
II. RELATED WORK
Seminal research in SLP first defined the problem of location
privacy for WSNs [4], [10]. The authors of [4] developed
widely adopted formalisations of the problem and explored
a set of privacy-preserving algorithms. They proposed the
fake source approach to solving the SLP problem, whilst also
acknowledging its poor performance in terms of maintaining
location privacy and high energy consumption requirements.
The problem subsequently attracted much research interest,
often motivated by the needs of specific problem domains [11],
[12], [13]. It has since been shown that, for some categories
of attacker model, fake sources can provide high levels of
SLP whilst realising a trade-off between security and network
energy consumption [7], [8].
Alternative approaches to the SLP problem have been
proposed, including prominent techniques that build on work
in phantom routing [4]. The majority of this work has fo-
cused on altering the nature of the random walks used in
routing [14], [15], [16], with some research seeking, as with
fake sources, to balance privacy and energy consumption [17].
However, as it has been shown that many phantom routing-
based techniques are vulnerable to correlation-based source
identification, routing traceback, and reducing source space,
the use of fake sources remains an active area of research.
Despite much interest in the fake source approach, many
practical issues must be addressed before the technique can be
applied to a wider spectrum of monitoring problems. Work in
the past decade has addressed the issue of having multiple sink
nodes, often under strong network model assumptions and with
a view to minimising energy consumption [18], [19]. However,
little research has considered the implications of using state-
of-the-art fake source approaches in networks with multiple
sources, the issue that is the focus of this paper.
III. MODELS
A. Network Model
A wireless sensor node has a unique identifier and a limited
set of computational capabilities. It is equipped with a radio
transmitter for communication. A WSN is a set of wireless
sensor nodes with communication links between pairs of
nodes. We assume that all nodes in the network have the same
communication range. The nodes in direct communication
range with a node n are known as the neighbours of n.
There exists a distinguished node in the network, known as
the sink, which is responsible for collecting data and which
acts as a link between the WSN and the external world. Other
nodes sense data and route it attached to messages along a
computed route to the sink. We assume the network is event-
triggered, i.e., when a node senses an object, it starts sending
messages periodically to the sink. We assume the message to
be encrypted and that the source nodes include their ID in
messages. Using the ID the sink can infer an asset’s location.
We do not assume that WSN nodes have access to GPS.
B. Attacker Model
It was proposed in [20] that the strength of an attacker for
WSNs can be factored along two dimensions, namely presence
and actions. Presence captures the network coverage of the
attacker, while actions capture the attacks the attacker can
launch. We assume a mobile distributed eavesdropper attacker
based on the patient adversary, introduced in [4]. Such an
attacker is reactive in nature and initially starts at the sink.
In general, the attacker need not start at the sink, this simply
guarantees they will receive a message. When the attacker is
located at a node n and receives a message from a neighbour
node m, the attacker will move to m, that 1-hop neighbour
of n from which he received the message, if that message
had not been received before. We assume the attacker has the
same communication range as the network nodes. To detect
if a message has been received before, we assume that an
attacker has access to the message type, sequence number and
source ID. When an attacker receives a message, they can
move one step in an inferred direction. Repeating this action
for a number of times may enable the attacker to capture an
asset based on a traceback of the traffic flow to the asset.
Once the source has been found, the attacker will no longer
move. We assume that the attacker has the capability to detect
the direction of message arrival and and a large amount of
memory to keep track of information such as messages that
have been heard. This is commensurate with the attacker
models used in [5], [21], [22]. Our aim in providing SLP
is to make using the context of messages too expensive for
attackers, such that they instead choose to perform alternate
attacks such as a brute force search of the network.
The adopted model may be considered relatively weak
compared to the more powerful attacker models proposed
in [20]. This weaker model has been chosen because some of
the stronger models include behaviours that are unlikely for
the attacker to perform as he will not be able to extract further
information from the network. The authors of [20] developed
a total order on the set of actions an attacker can perform on
a WSN. The order is as follows:
eavesdrop→ crash→ disturbing→ limited passive→
passive→ reprogramming
Aside from eavesdropping, an attacker could attempt to disrupt
the functioning of the network, e.g., a DoS attack, but this
would limit the amount of useful information the attacker
could gather. Alternatively, the attacker could try to modify
a node’s software in order to learn more information about
the network, but this is a time-consuming process, that would
lead to the safety period being exceeded, i.e., the asset will
have moved location. In both cases, the attacker will either
not learn anything useful or the action will take too long.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Network Simulation and Configurations
The TOSSIM (v2.1.2) simulation environment was used in
all experiments [23]. TOSSIM is a discrete event simulator
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Fig. 1: Network configurations for multiple source simulation experiments.
TABLE I: Link Layer Model parameters.
Name Value
PATH LOSS EXPONENT 4.7
SHADOWING STANDARD DEVIATION 3.2
D0 1.0
PL D0 55.4
NOISE FLOOR -105
S [(0.9, -0.7); (-0.7, 1.2)]
WHITE GAUSSIAN NOISE 4
capable of accurately modelling sensor nodes and the modes
of communications between them. The fake source protocol
implemented was the adaptive algorithm proposed in [22],
since this provided best-in-class privacy whilst obviating the
need for an extensive exploration of parameters.
A square grid network layout of size n×n was used, where
n ∈ {11, 15, 21}, i.e., networks with 121, 225, and 441 sensor
nodes. These network sizes where chosen to maintain com-
parability with previous work in source location privacy [22].
The node neighbourhoods were generated using Link Layer
Model with the parameters shown in Table I, which gives
a small chance of asymmetric links occurring. The network
configurations are shown in Figure 1, where nodes, sources
and the sink are represented by circles, pentagon and squares
respectively. These network configurations are commensurate
with those in [5] and remained consistent across network sizes.
B. Safety Period and Broadcast Rates
The overall objective of any WSN-based SLP solution is to
ensure that an asset is never captured through the WSN.
However, two issues arise: (i) if the asset is not mobile,
the attacker can take as long as it requires to perform an
exhaustive search of the network, and (ii) if the asset is mobile,
performing an exhaustive search of the network is unsuitable
as the attacker may focus on a location only to find the
asset has moved. Knowing this, the SLP problem can only
be considered when it is time-bounded.
This notion of time-boundedness has been termed safety
period. There are two competing definitions of safety period.
The first, used primarily by routing-based techniques, e.g., [4],
is where the safety period is defined as the time required to
capture the asset. The aim of these techniques is to maximise
the safety period, i.e., the higher the time to capture, the higher
the level of SLP provided [4]. On the other hand, the second
notion of safety period is used where it is desirable to bound
the amount of time over which SLP is considered. Specifically,
SLP is then said to be provided if an attacker fails to capture a
source within the safety period. The safety period is set such
that it has a value greater than the time to capture.
Allowing the safety period to be greater than the capture
time means that the level of SLP obtained is bounded below.
Specifically, denoting safety period by τs and capture time
by τc, if an asset is not captured at τs, then it means that
the asset is not captured at τc meaning that the SLP with τs
is lower bounded. The safety period intuitively captures the
maximum time an asset will be at a given location before its
next movement. Often, this can be obtained from previous data
gathering to know more about such mobile assets. For a given
network size and source rate, using flooding as a base routing
protocol, we calculate the average time it takes the attacker to
detect the real source, i.e., capture the asset. We term this the
capture time. The safety period is twice the capture time.
The rate at which messages were generated from each
source was varied, with results for 1, 2, 3 and 4 messages per
second shown in Section V as source periods of 1, 0.5, 0.25
and 0.125 seconds respectively. Results for other messages
rates was gathered, but only these two are shown for brevity.
A total of 500 repeats were performed for each fake source
experiment. Nodes were located 4.5 meters apart. The node
separation distance was determined experimentally, based on
observing the pattern of transmissions in the simulator. This
separation distance ensures that messages (i) pass through
multiple nodes from source to sink, (ii) can move only one hop
at a time, and (iii) will usually only be passed to horizontally
or vertically adjacent nodes.
V. RESULTS
A. Protectionless Privacy
To evaluate the privacy afforded by a source location privacy
algorithm, the inherent privacy provided by a network must
be understood. To do this we perform simulations for each
network configuration with no fake source protocol.
Figure 2 shows capture ratio against networks size for
protectionless network configurations with varying message
broadcast rates. As expected, Figure 2(a) shows that, in the
absence of any privacy preserving algorithm, the capture ratio
for a single source network is consistently 100% across all
network sizes. Similarly, Figures 2(b), 2(c) and 2(f) show
that the capture ratio is either 100% or close to it for all
networks with two sources, implying that the addition of a
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Fig. 2: Capture ratio plotted against network size for protectionless network configurations with varying message broadcast
rates. Figures 2(a)-(f) correspond to the network configurations shown in Figures 1(a)-(f) respectively.
further source has done little to hinder the attacker in their
pursuit of a source capture. The variation in network traffic
caused by multiple sources can produce a push-pull effect
on that attacker, similar to that observed in [22], that results
in less informed decision making. This effect can be seen in
Figure 2(c), where the attacker occasionally fails to make a
capture in a two source network, leading to a capture ratio of
less than 100%. Such high capture ratios can not be seen in
Figures 2(d) and 2(e), which implies that having more than
two sources can make it more challenging for an attacker to
capture a source node. It also serves to validate the scale of
the simulations, demonstrating that sources can not be trivially
located in multiple source networks of these sizes whilst
informing our view of the lower bound on practical network
size. Indeed, despite the multiple source configurations in
Figures 2(d) and 2(e) demonstrating inherent privacy, the
capture ratios remain high and form an appropriate baseline.
B. Privacy Preservation
Capture ratio is a metic used to indicate the level of SLP
afforded. Capture ratio is calculated as the ratio of the number
of runs in which a source is captured within the safety period to
the total number of runs. A capture ratio of 0% is indicative of
the highest possible levels of privacy, whilst a capture ratio of
100% implies the that no privacy is being afforded. Research
presented in [22] demonstrated that the algorithm analysed
achieves capture ratios of 0-7% in single source networks.
Figure 3 shows the capture ratio against networks size with
varying broadcast rates for each network configuration. The
capture ratios shown in Figure 3(a) are commensurate with
those achieved in [5], providing confidence in the efficacy
of approach and the simulation results presented for multiple
source networks. It is informative to contrast Figures 3(b), 3(c)
and 3(f), which are configurations of two sources that achieve
differing capture ratios. In 3(f) the capture ratio remains below
other two source configurations. Here the relative position of
the sources unifies them in their goal of dissuading an attacker.
The sources are in close enough proximity, given a particular
network scale, to allow the fake algorithm to be constructive
in fake source selection. In contrast, the configuration in
Figure 3(c) creates a situation where the creation of fake
sources is destructive in realising the privacy preservation
of each source. This situation is exasperated in Figure 3(f),
which suffers from the sink being at a network extremity.
The problem of providing SLP in this situation has been
acknowledged [5]. This effect is only amplified where sources
in close proximity increase the information on the network
for an attacker to use in making inferences, as is the case in
Figure 3(f). The capture ratios for configurations with more
than two sources, shown in Figures 3(d) and 3(e), indicate
that the fake source algorithm generally improved privacy.
Moreover, the best case privacy afforded in these cases is not
dissimilar to that of a single source network, at around 4% and
6% for the largest three and four source networks respectively.
The performance depicted in Figure 3(d) is encouraging in
this regard, though it is crucial to note that the average case
performance for configurations with multiple sources, whilst
better in general, can deteriorate due to a privacy preserving
algorithm. For example, in the case of sources with source
period of 0.25-1.0 in Figure 3(e), the afforded privacy is
commensurate or worse than the same configurations for the
protectionless cases in Figure 2(e). This worst case suggests
that fake source algorithms founded on shared assumptions
must be reconsidered to account multiple sources.
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Fig. 3: Capture ratio plotted against network size for each network configuration with varying message broadcast rates.
Figures 3(a)-(f) correspond to the network configurations shown in Figures 1(a)-(f) respectively.
C. Energy Efficiency
Broadcasting is typically the most energy consuming task
that a sensor node can perform. This makes the number of
messages broadcast is a reasonable indicator of network energy
consumption when considering algorithms independently of
deployment scenario, sensor technology or broadcast protocol.
Figure 4 shows the mean number of messages broadcast per
node per second against networks size with varying broadcast
rates for each network configuration. In an event-triggered
network it is intuitive that increasing the source period results
in a commensurate increase in the mean number of messages
broadcast regardless of configuration. It is less apparent that
having multiple sources in a network should reduce the mean
number of messages broadcast, as seen in Figure 4. This
reduction is, in part, associated with the reduced number of
messages broadcast in the restricted regions reserved around
each source node. The number of the these regions increases
linearly with the number of sources, though regions may over-
lap to produce areas of constructive or destructive interference.
Reducing the number of messages broadcast as more sources
are added is a desirable characteristic, though this efficiency
must be balanced against privacy. Indeed, as these results
indicate, the development of an energy efficient, fake source
algorithm for multiple sources remains an open problem.
D. Discussion
The results presented motivate the development of fake source
algorithms that are applicable in the context of networks with
multiple sources, not least because the worst-case privacy
afforded by current generation algorithms can deteriorate to
levels below that of a protectionless network. In the design
of these algorithms, the results imply that it is not only the
number of sources that impact afforded privacy, the relative
locations of the sources are significant in determining the like-
lihood of their privacy being preserved. Knowledge of relative
locations would, even for adaptive fake source algorithms,
provide opportunities to obviate the destructive interference
caused by overlapping broadcast restrictions, remedy network
extremity source location and utilise the energy efficient char-
acteristics of current algorithms. This positional knowledge
should be foremost in the design of fake source algorithms.
It should be noted that the results presented are based on
the consideration of a limited set of network configurations,
chosen for consistency with existing literature or to expose an
underlying performance characteristic. Similarly, the algorithm
was selected for its alignment with the body of existing fake
source algorithms and its known level of privacy provision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Privacy preserving algorithms for WSNs with multiple sources
are becoming fundamental to problems in a wide range of
application domains. This paper has presented results for a
representative fake source algorithm operating in networks
with multiple information sources. These results demonstrated
that, in the worst case, using protectionless communication
can provide better privacy than a fake source algorithms
in networks with multiple information sources, as well as
being used to identify shortcomings in the considerations of
current fake source algorithms, particularly with regard to their
accounting for the relative locations of sources.
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